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Article 5

Why Are Professionals Worried About RICO?
Jay Kelly Wright*
Because all practitioners who offer comments on RICO are influenced by their own experience, let me begin by stating my own. I bring
the perspective of a defense lawyer who has represented professionals in
civil litigation under RICO. These civil cases have no criminal counterparts; the civil RICO suits have been filed against individuals not
threatened with criminal prosecution despite extensive investigation by
grand juries or government enforcement agencies, such as the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission. The cases typically arise in
a commercial setting in which there has been a business failure, and the
civil RICO suits are filed against a number of defendants who allegedly
"contributed" in some way to that failure.'
The "professionals" to whom I refer in the title of this paper include
lawyers and accountants, but observations apply equally to a broader,
generic class of people who have become RICO defendants in such situations. These are people whose services are a necessary or facilitating ingredient of a business transaction of some type, but who lack a direct
stake in the success of the transaction. Besides lawyers and accountants,
lenders, appraisers, engineers and other "experts" fall into this class.
When I participate in continuing legal education programs on
RICO, I usually concentrate on legal issues of particular interest to professionals who are civil RICO defendants. These issues are often litigated at the motion to dismiss phase of a civil RICO action and include:
* whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires factual substantiation of allegations of fraud against a professional;
* whether a professional can be said to be "conducting the affairs" of
an entity that receives the professional's services, within the meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); and
* whether a professional is subject to respondeat superior liability
under RICO and, if so, under what standards.
This conference, however, provides an opportunity to go beyond
these nuts-and-bolts topics. We have an opportunity to look critically at
RICO and ask more fundamental questions. Is RICO fair and just? Does
it promote the objectives of compensation and deterrence that are
ascribed to it by its advocates? These are questions I will address here. I
have taken litigation against professionals as the point of departure in
order to draw upon my own experience.
*

Mr. Wright is a partner at Arnold & Porter and has represented parties in RICO litigation.

I For example, the author continues to represent one of the accounting firm defendants in the
RICO case that led to the decision in Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983) (one of the leading cases approving the use of civil RICO in the business tort context).
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The Position of Professionals

Professionals are worried about RICO. The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, for example, has been in the forefront of
some of the legislative efforts to amend RICO to limit the statute's reach.
Moreover, many members of the organized bar have voiced opposition
to the present breadth of the application of civil RICO. The reservations
of many business lawyers were expressed in 1985 by the report of the Ad
Hoc Civil RICO Task Force (chaired by a participant in this Symposium)
of the American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law. The organized bar is divided; countervailing views were
put forth by other bar groups. 2 But lawyers today are voicing reservations about RICO, in marked contrast to the much more diffident stance
of the organized bar a decade ago, when RICO was enacted.
At first glance, it might appear puzzling that professionals are in the
forefront of proposals to curtail RICO. The accounting profession is
widely regarded, and rightly so, as a profession of high integrity.3 The
legal profession, though perhaps not superior in moral fiber to society in
general, is certainly not worse. My thesis is that professionals today feel
especially vulnerable to RICO, not because they perceive their own conduct as particulary culpable, but because they view RICO as reinforcing
and exacerbating trends in the law that have discarded or eroded longstanding prudential limitations on a professional's liability for economic
loss. These trends have now exposed professionals to enormous, potentially indeterminate damages wholly disproportionate to the professional's undertaking or conduct. This consequence has resulted from a
variety of interrelated factors: erosion of traditional limitations on a professional's liability for negligence; expansion of standing doctrines that
have traditionally limited exposure; erosion of the scienter requirement
essential to establishing fraud; and a blurring of sharp definitions of
proximate cause.
Ironically, developments increasing the exposure of professionals
have occurred at the same time the law has responded sympathetically to
pleas from corporate directors that personal liability arising from directorial actions should be curtailed. In many states, a director now enjoys
protection from personal liability so long as there is no evidence of selfdealing or personal gain from the challenged conduct. The result of
these countervailing developments is that in cases of business failure, the
"innocent victims"-shareholders, creditors, and those who purport to
sue for their benefit-turn increasingly to professionals, indeed, sometimes exclusively to professionals, for economic redress.
The emergence of civil RICO is not solely responsible for these developments, but civil RICO has exacerbated those tendencies of the law
to target professionals as deep pockets. Not only has RICO spurred the
search for deep pockets by the lure of treble damages, the rhetoric of
RICO has significantly distorted the formulation of legal principles and
2

See A Comprehensive Perspectiveon Civil and CriminalRICO Legislation and Litigation, RICO CASES
1985 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE.
See, e.g., Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
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has skewed analysis in favor of greater liability. Thus, modification of
existing RICO law-whether legislatively or judicially-is probably an essential first step to restoring balance and reason to the liability of
professionals.
II.

The Non-RICO Background

RICO, as I have indicated, is not solely responsible for the present
state of the law concerning the exposure of professionals. Accordingly, I
first review some of the significant developments apart from RICO.
A.

Negligence and the "'Privity'"Rule

For decades, a professional's exposure to damages for negligence
was limited by the "privity" rule espoused by ChiefJudge Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche. 4 The case was brought by a factoring firm, Ultramares Corporation, that had extended credit to an importer, Fred Stem & Co., and was
left unpaid when Stern declared bankruptcy. The plaintiff, Ultramares,
then turned to the defendant accounting firm, Touche Niven & Co.,
which had audited Stem's financial statements on which Ultramares allegedly relied in extending credit. Ultramares alleged that where Stem's
financial statements showed a solvent company, in reality, Stem's management had created fictitious assets to conceal an insolvency. Ultramares asserted both negligence and fraud claims against the
accounting firm for failure to uncover Stern's fraud.
Judge Cardozo ruled that, while the defendant accounting firm could
be liable for Ultramares' loss if the accountants had committed fraud, the
accountants were protected from liability for negligence alone. Cardozo
refused to allow the negligence liability of an accountant to extend to all
foreseeable losses, and instead adopted the "privity" rule: the accountant was not liable for Ultramares' loss because Ultramares was not in
"privity." Cardozo, fifteen years earlier, had rejected contractual privity
as a limitation on the consequences of a manufacturer's negligence in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,5 and had observed that in that context
"[t]he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding . . . apace." 6
Nonetheless, Cardozo rejected the analogy between an accountant's negligent "slip" and a defective physical product. The absence of a privity
rule, Cardozo reasoned, would "expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
7
class"-"too extreme" a burden for the law to sensibly create.
The "privity" rule of Ultramares has been important in placing
bounds on the liability of many professionals-accountants, lawyers, appraisers and tide abstractors, to name only a few. Despite criticism of the
rule-which swelled in the 1970s and 1980s, but may have peaked-the
4
5
6
7

255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
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concerns expressed by Judge Cardozo remain firmly embedded in the
law of professional liability.
The leading decision to criticize and reject the "privity" rule was the
1983 decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.8 The New Jersey court viewed the privity rule as an anachronism by
considering what the court perceived to be a change in certified public
accountants' function over time. The court stated:
At one time the audit was made primarily to inform management
of irregularities and inefficiencies in the business .... Gradually a
need for independent audits was generated by public ownership of
business enterprises and by requirements of the stock exchanges and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Institutional investors, investment specialists, stockholders, and lenders demanded more
and reliable information. It is now well recognized that the audited
statements are made for the use of third parties who have no contractual relationship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common knowledge
that companies use audits for many proper business purposes, such as
submission to banks and other lending institutions that might advance
funds and to suppliers of services and goods that might advance
credit .... These uses as well as governmental requirements make
financial statements reviewed by independent qualified accountants
indispensable. 9
The Rosenblum court dismissed as inconsequential Judge Cardozo's
articulated concern about subjecting professionals to "indeterminate" liability. To the Rosenblum court, this concern was solved simply by loss
spreading, the same solution the court clearly believed was taking place
in response to the expansion of the product liability occurring at the
same time. The court stated perfunctorily that inasmuch as accountants
had "been able to obtain insurance covering" their existing liability,
there was "no reason to believe" that insurance would not also cover
liability under broader liability rules. 10
Some observers predicted that the "privity" concept would be obliterated,'1 but this has not happened. While a few jurisdictions followed
NewJersey's Rosenblum,1 2 a greater number have retained the privity concept in some form. New York itself reconsidered the Ultramares rule and
eventually reaffirmed it in 1985.13 Today, most jurisdictions follow an
approach requiring privity, or a variation based upon section 552 of the
8 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
9 Id at 345, 461 A.2d at 149.
10 Id at 349 & n.ll, 461 A.2d at 151 & n.ll.
11 See, e.g., Recent Developments, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: CPA's Liable At Common Law to Certain Reasonably Forseeable Third Parties Who Deterimentally Rely on Negligently Audited FinancialStatements,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1985); Recent Decisions, Tort Law - The EnlargingScope ofAuditors' Liability
toRelying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DasE L. REV. 281 (1983); New Jersey Developments, Rosenblum,
Inc. v. Adler: The New Jersey Supreme Court Expands Accountants' Liability, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 161
(1984).
12 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); International Mortgage Co. v.John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1986); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
13 Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493
N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts. 14 Moreover, almost without exception,
the few courts that have abandoned the privity rule entirely have voiced a
need to replace it with some other doctrine to guard against unbounded
liability. 15
In addition to the rejection of the privity rule in some jurisdictions,
the rule has become a less significant limitation on the liability of professionals than it once was. The diminished importance of the privity rule
results from other parallel developments, discussed below.
B.

Erosion of the Scienter Requirementfor Fraud

The privity requirement applied where a professional was sued for
negligence. Where fraud is alleged, a professional has traditionally faced
broader liability under common law, under federal securities laws, andmore recently--under RICO. While some have argued that fraud-based
liability should be of no concern to the honest professional, the argument fails to take into account a significant weakening of the scienter
requirement of fraud that has occurred in practice. While the Supreme
Court has declared that the "concepts of recklessness and negligence
have no place" in criminal antitrust enforcement,' 6 in other contexts the
scienter element has been expanded to embrace "recklessness" in decisions of the lower federal courts.' 7 Attempts have been made by appellate courts to tighten the concept of recklessness by reference to
"conscious avoidance" or "willful blindness."' s But the overall track
record is mixed; no professional can be particularly confident that a deliberate intent to defraud will protect that professional against being second-guessed for a good faith error ofjudgment.
For example, in the wake of fraud convictions of top management at
the National Student Marking Corporation, in the 1970s, a partner in a
major accounting firm was prosecuted for having "recklessly" failed to
react to "suspicious" facts suggesting that the partner was the victim of
his client's fraud. At sentencing the trial judge indicated that no finding
of the partner's actual knowledge of falsity and intent to deceive was necessary for conviction: "I think you are absolutely sincere when you say
that you do not believe that you did anything wrong in this audit or au14 For a review of case law, see Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort
Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 1929 (1988).
15 See, e.g., Rosenblum, 93 NJ. at 328, 461 A.2d at 144; Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt &
Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 387, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1984) (articulating six factors to be considered in
determining whether recoveries should be denied "under the facts of [a] particular case as a matter
of policy"). Academic reaction to the privity rule has been mixed. A body of articles expressed
criticism of Ultramares and enthusiastically embraced the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
Rosenblum. See articles cited in Silidano, supra note 14, at 1937-39. However, some commentators
more recently have indicated that the criticism of Ultramares is unsound. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary? 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988); Siliciano, supra note 14.
16 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Howard v.
United States, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 312 (1st Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Labus v. United States, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699-703 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976); Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task
Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CORP. BANKING & Bus. L. 346-48.
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dits.... But the tragedy is that the jury found that this was an audit or
audits done with reckless disregard for what was really involved." 19 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, not on
the ground that the evidence was sufficient to find that the partner actually knew of his own client's fraud, but simply upon a determination that
there was sufficient evidence that the professional knew of circumstances
20
that were "suspicious."
In another illustration of the same tendency, the SEC recently imposed administrative sanctions upon a broker/dealer in an opinion that
deftly transformed "gross negligence" into scienter. The SEC equated a
finding that the respondent was "grossly negligent" with recklessness
and then equated reckless conduct with a "willful" violation of section 17
of the Securities Act of 1933.21
Such sleight of hand has demolished a considerable part of the protection theoretically afforded by a scienter requirement. Questions of intent and good faith are generally questions left to the trier of fact. Thus,
even under the best of circumstances a professional will typically be
judged by a jury of lay persons: a jury unfamiliar with the professional's
discipline by their own experience and whose only information comes
from a courtroom battle of experts. Even when the evidence is consistent with the professional's "good faith," the jury's opposite conclusion
may be upheld. 22 When the line between intentional misconduct and
negligence is blurred, jurors second-guess the professional with little
more constraint than a general admonition to act reasonably-a situation
that does little to inspire a professional's confidence in the law's fairness.
C. Erosion of Standing Limitations
Despite the loss of the privity rule for negligence actions as well as
the weakening of the scienter requirement in some jurisdictions, a professional's liability has traditionally been bounded by doctrines of standing and causation. Where a professional has rendered service to a failed
business entity, these doctrines have traditionally stood between the professional's insurance policy and the economic losses of everyone who is
injured by a business failure. In the Rosenblum case, for example, the accountant was sued by a creditor of the bankrupt company that was the
accountant's client. The court stressed that the accountant was liable to
the plaintiff-with whom the accountant had no contact-because the
plaintiff actually suffered economic loss from having obtained and relied
2
upon the accountant's audit report on financial statements. 3
Recently, however, these prudential limitations on a professional's
exposure rooted in elementary standing requirements have begun to receive short shrift. Creative receivers and trustees of insolvent corporations have begun asserting that they are the proper parties to sue for the
19 Howard, infra note 35, at 62.
20 527 F.2d at 320.
21 In the Matter of Bamberg, Exchange Act Release No. 27672 (February 5, 1990).
22 County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1391-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
aff'd on other grounds, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
23 93 N.J. at 351-53, 461 A.2d at 153.
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losses of creditors who have made claims against their respective insolvent estates. On occasion, a receiver or trustee has asserted that the
amount of a bankrupt company's insolvency (or some component of that
amount) is an injury to the company itself, for which the company's representative may sue an outside professional. By this leap of logic, the
bankrupt company's representative attempts to transform the economic
losses of the company's creditors (which is what the insolvency represents) into a damage claim assertable by the company itself.
For example, the trustee of Auto-Train Corporation, a defunct railroad company, sued the company's outside auditors to recover essentially the entire shortfall between the company's assets and claims against
the estate. Although the company's financial difficulties had been so severe that, for a number of years, the outside auditors had rendered opinions on the financial statements containing a going concern qualification,
the trustee's theory was that the accountants should have given the company's outside directors more detail concerning the company's financial
position and operations. The trustee asserted that the outside directors
could then have taken steps that could have turned the company around.
The trustee obtained an $11 million jury verdict against the accountants-a sum approximating the company's insolvency. Until reversed by
the court of appeals because of insufficient evidence of causation, the
judgment stood as a signal that the economic loss in the way of business
failure may be visited upon a hapless, deep pocket professional. 24 Such
efforts to end-run the traditional rules of standing have received a mixed
reception in the courts. 2 5 However, a RICO case is one of the first cases
to be receptive to the tactic.
In Schacht v. Brown,2 6 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered a RICO complaint alleging that the officers and directors,
outside auditors and reinsurers of an insolvent insurance company had
conspired to conceal that company's insolvency from state regulators,
with the alleged result that the company was allowed to stay in business
and engage in operations that allegedly "deepened" the insolvency. The
plaintiff was the state's top insurance regulator, appointed to act as liquidator of the insolvent company. In holding that the complaint stated a
claim-the court did not address the merits of the controversy-the Seventh Circuit had to confront traditional standing doctrine indicating that
the plaintiff had sustained no recoverable damages. Under state law, the
state insurance regulator as liquidator was restricted to asserting claims
of the insolvent company and could not assert the claims of creditors.
The complaint alleged that the company had already been insolvent
when the concealment fraud began, and, under traditional law, the
24 See Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
25 Compare, e.g., Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972); Williams v.
California First Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988); Kelly v. Overseas Investors, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 622,
219 N.E.2d 288, 272 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1966) with Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 155 A.D.2d 314, 547 N.Y.S.2d 590
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
26 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
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"worsening" or "deepened" insolvency caused no damage to the company, although obviously creditors were damaged.
However, the Seventh Circuit-perhaps impressed by the gravity of
the offenses charged-decided to ignore that doctrine. The court invented a new rule that deepening of the insolvency amounts to damage
to the corporation. The "corporate body is ineluctably damaged," the
Seventh Circuit stated, "by the deepening of its insolvency, through increased exposure to creditor liability." 27 The court went on: "[I]n most
cases, it would be crucial that the insolvency of the corporation be disdosed, so that the shareholders may exercise their right to dissolve the
corporation in order to cut their losses." 2 8This reasoning cannot be
squared with the concept of limited liability by incorporation, which
means that shareholders have no personal liability; when their corporation becomes insolvent, continued operations do not cause the shareholders additional "exposure," and they have no "losses" to "cut" by
dissolution.
The Schacht result is best understood as a legal fiction permitting
creditors' damages to be asserted against the defendants using the company's liquidator as a convenient plaintiff.2 9 Adhering to traditional
standing doctrine, the Seventh Circuit feared, would have created "perverse incentives for wrong-doing officers and directors."3 0 (Ignored in
this passage of the court's opinion were the professionals and other outsiders who were swept into the case as additional defendants.)
The Schacht result and the Seventh Circuit's langauge illustrate the
pressure placed upon legal rules by the use of RICO. The Schacht court's
modification of traditional standing rules has now been transplanted into
non-RICO contexts. With increasing frequency, legal representatives of
a failed enterprise now seek to shift to professionals all or part of a huge
and indeterminate aggregation of the economic losses that fall upon
third parties when there is a business failure. For example, it is alleged
that an accountant's "negligent" audit allowed the client to submit audited financial statements that showed a healthy enterprise and perpetuated its existence. But for the accountant's negligence, it is alleged, the
"truth" would have been discovered and the enterprise's troubles
halted-often by regulatory takeover. Accordingly, the accountant-so it
is alleged-is liable for all of the losses caused to creditors by the enterprise's failure, on the theory that the accountant contributed to the
31
wrongful preservation of the enterprise's life.
Accountants are currently the most frequent targets of such allegations; however, they are not the only professionals vulnerable. It has not
27 Id. at 1350.
28 Id.
29 In another case decided six years after Schacht, the Seventh Circuit articulated a more candid
rationale for suits by the bankrupt entity. See Mid-State Fertilizer v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d
1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1989) ("recovery by the firm handles everything automatically-for investors,
workers, lessors and others share any recovery according to the same rules that govern all receipts").
Mid-State makes sense only if all who share a recovery "automatically" are entitled to shift their
losses to the defendant.
30 Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1350.
31 See, e.g., Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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taken long for those who administer estates having liabilities grossly exceeding the assets to realize that lawyers, as well as, accountants, can be
accused of wrongfully contributing to the perpetuation of an enterprise's
life. A lawyer's opinion or preparation of a legal document, no less than
the accountant's audit report, may be a practical necessity for an enterprise's continuation in business or consummation of a transaction. The
lawyer, no less than the accountant, may find himself accused of contributing to a client's wrongdoing by offering professional services.
In theory, one can imagine fact patterns where the Schacht court's
result-oriented doctrinal revisions appeal to a sense ofjustice. In the real
world, however, where a professional's failure to discover someone else's
wrongdoing and "blow the whistle" may be equated to fraud, which may
be equated with a RICO violation, the ease with which the Schacht court
dispensed with traditional protections afforded by the law justifiably
chills responsible professionals.
D.

Erosion of Limitations Based Upon Proximate Cause

The law has many strands that have been designed to make exposure
manageable and predictable. The concept of proximate cause is frequently utilized to place limits on a person's liability. Likewise, the "economic loss" doctrine is utilized to keep liability from extending to losses
remote from the defendant's conduct, even though linked to the defend32
ant's conduct by a chain of causation-in-fact.
The protection afforded professionals by these doctrines has, however, been quite uneven. The "economic loss" doctrine is another manifestation of the same concerns leading Judge Cardozo to endorse the
privity rule for professional liability. Yet some courts have excluded accountants from its application. Moreover, concepts of proximate cause
and remoteness have gone unmentioned in cases where accountants, law
firms and lenders are accused of unlawfully prolonging the life of a
company.3 3
E.

The Searchfor Professional "Deep Pockets"

No one would seriously argue that a professional should be immunized for consequences of that professional's conduct if wrongful. All
too often, however, our legal system has, in pursuit of compensation
objectives, saddled a professional with liability wholly disproportionate
to the professional's alleged misconduct. For example, in a recent securities litigation with which I am unfortunately all too familiar, four venture
capital organizations turned to professionals to recover their losses in an
exploration and development company that fell victim to the energy recession. The investors alleged that they had been defrauded by the com32 See, e.g., Andersen Elec. Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246
(1986).
33 See, e.g., Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Tew v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla.), amend in part, 741 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(Chase Manhattan Bank accused of wrongfully prolonging life of securities broker-dealer being
looted by its own officers and directors).
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pany's management at the time of the investment. But the investors
recovered the entire amount of their investment-not from the company's managers, but from a law firm and accounting firm that failed to
detect what was alleged to constitute wrongdoing by the company's
34
managers.
Examples such as this one are not happenstance. When there are
widespread enterprise failures and a perceived need to recoup resulting
economic loss-failures of insurance companies and financial institutions
come immediately to mind-some immediately proclaim the availability
of recovery from deep pocket professionals as the perfect solution to the
problem. For example, one commentator on insurance insolvencies
targets the independent accountants as the "defendant of choice" for a
law suit brought to "infuse assets into the estate" of the insolvent insurance carrier. 35 Indeed, this commentator views accountants as "the defendant of choice" precisely because they are less to blame for the
catastrophe:
Auditors are preferred defendants for several reasons. First, it is
more likely that they will have appropriate E&O insurance in place
with high limits of liability. By contrast, those who mismanaged or
defrauded their own concern may well have also been remiss in
purchasing any, or adequate D&O insurance. Second, insurance aside,
individual directors and officers are less likely to have deep pockets
while independent accounting firms-especially the larger ones-will
typically be organized as general partnerships and will have deep
pockets. Third, even assuming adequate insurance is in place, the
managers are more likely to be adjudged liable for fraud, and fraud is
a conduct exclusion in virtually all D&O insurance policies. Thus,
when an insurer's liquidator sues a defunct insurance company's managers and auditor, he is likely to view the suit against the accountants
as more viable and as a more realistic means of maximizing
the infu36
sion of substantial assets into the insolvent's estate.
Such realities have now provoked a number of lawsuits against accounting firms in the wake of insurance company insolvencies. 37
The same impulse to find the deep pocket can be seen vividly in the
wave of litigation that has commenced following the savings and loan
crisis. The failure of savings and loan institutions places enormous demand upon the funds insuring deposits. Those who managed the failed
institutions-and are accused of practices that are imprudent or worseeither cannot be found or have only modest resources. The government
thus looks to deep pockets-for example, accountants and lawyers who
provided services to failed thrifts-on which to lay off some of the large
losses. The FDIC has commenced a number of lawsuits against auditors
34 See, e.g., Sioux, Ltd., Sec. Litig. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 914 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.), rev'g on rehearing,
901 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1990).
35 D. Howard, Making Accountants Account For Themselves When An Insurance Company Has No More
Tomorrows, February, 1990 INSURANCE LITIGATION Rpm. 60.
36 Id
37 See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Merin
v. Yegen Holdings Corp., 240 N.J. Super. 480, 573 A.2d 928 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 149 A.D.2d 165, 545 N.Y.S.2d 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
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of the financial statements of failed thrifts with damages demanded aggregating into the billions of dollars.38 Lest lawyers feel left out, it
should be noted that the FDIC has taken a similar approach with respect
to law firms.8 9
III. The Contribution of RICO to the Search for Deep Pockets
Although the search for the deep pocket did not originate with
RICO, RICO has given the search added impetus by raising the stakes in
civil litigation to treble damages. Treble damages become a weapon to
induce settlement. The commentator favoring accountants as the "defendant of choice" in insurance insolvency litigation enthusiastically
notes:
[THo induce an earlier and more favorable settlement, the [liquidator]
will wish to charge the auditor not merely with negligence or breach of
contract, but with common law and statutory fraud (such as RICO)
because the latter counts create the prospect of recovering punitive or
treble damages as well as costs and counsel fees. 40
RICO has also exacerbated the uncertainty that has resulted from
blurring the line between "fraud" and innocent conduct which may be
criticized by hindsight. The concept of "fraud" from RICO's mail and
wire fraud predicates is an elastic one which risks subjecting professionals simply to being second-guessed. Before the passage of RICO, when
mail and wire fraud statutes were the exclusive province of prosecutors,
courts were inclined to interpret "scheme to defraud" in open-ended
fashion, relying upon prosecutorial discretion to sort out culpable from
non-culpable conduct. Thus, appellate courts have written expansive
language such as this statement from the Fifth Circuit:
The fraudulent aspect of the scheme to "defraud" is measured by
a nontechnical standard. Law puts its imprimatur on the accepted
moral standards and condemns conduct which fails to match the "reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and
'4 1
right dealing in the general and business life of members of society."
Given the imprecision with which "fraud" is defined as a RICO
predicate, an argument frequently made by RICO enthusiasts-that no
innocent person should worry because "good faith" is a complete defense-is out of step with real-world practice.
Finally, RICO has distorted the analysis and application of traditional, salutary legal doctrine. It will be recalled that it was a RICO case,
Schacht v. Brown, that introduced uncertainty into the concepts of standing, causation and damages when a trustee or receiver sues a profes38 Suits Target Deep Pockets of Accountants, American Banker, March 13, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
39 See, e.g., FDIC v. Bauman, Civ. Action No. 3-90-614-H (N.D. Tex. 1990); FDIC v. Wise, No.
90-1688 (D. Colo. 1990); Harlan & Barrett, FDIC Sues Dallas-AreaLawyers in Vernon, Wall St.J., Mar.
21, 1990, at B8, col. 1; Government Targets Lawyers in Thrift Suits, Nat. L.J., Apr. 2, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
40 Howard, supra note 35, at 60.
41 Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Gregory v. United States,
253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958)). But see Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir.
1989) (criticizing Blachly).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:983

sional in the wake of a corporate insolvency. The uncertainty caused by
Schacht may eventually be corrected by the courts. In the meantime,
however, it results in uncertainty and untold litigation expense and burden for professionals who happen to be convenient targets in the wake of
a business failure.
IV.

Problems and Solutions

The imposition of disproportionate liability upon professionals has
created a serious imbalance. People first in line for moral condemnation
are ignored in the search for money. Peripheral figures and their insurance carriers become the exclusive sources of monetary recovery. This
imbalance is real, not merely theoretical. Few observers of the savings
and loan crisis expect that a large part of the cleanup cost will be recovered from people who managed the thrifts into insolvency or borrowers
who defaulted. 42 However, the FDIC has begun multimillion dollar lawsuits against accounting firms and law firms to lay off part of the enor43
mous government obligations to deal with failed thrift institutions.
This imbalance is offensive to deep-seated concepts of justice. Proportionality of the sanction to the culpability of the conduct is an important part of our law. The "principle of proportionality" has been
recognized by the Supreme Court to be "deeply routed and frequently
repeated in common-law jurisprudence" and has been made the basis of
44
eighth amendment analysis.
By placing a disproportionate monetary burden on those who,
although comparatively free of blame, happen to have resources, the
deep pocket approach has serious costs. This approach dilutes the moral
force of the law and breeds cynicism on the part of those deep pockets
who are targets. This is disturbing to professionals, and it should be disturbing to everyone. Professionals are the people frequently relied upon
to inject considerations of propriety in business transactions. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, has proclaimed:
The important role which professionals, particularly attorneys and
accountants, play in assuring adherence to the Federal Securities laws
has long been recognized. Clearly, the Commission would be unable
to administer effectively those laws in an environment in which issuers,
underwriters, and others involved in the capital-raising process were
not routinely served by professionals of the highest integrity and competence, well-versed
in the requirements of the statutory scheme Con45
gress has created.
42 See Fraud Was Only A Small FactorInS & L Losses, ConsultantAsserts, Wall St.J.,July 20, 1990, A2,
col. 1.
43 See, e.g., Villa & Murphy, Emerging Theories of Liability For Lending Counsel, in PLI Litigating For
and Against The FDIC and the RTC 257 (1990).
44 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
45 In re Carter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84, 148 (1981) (citation omitted). See also In
re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973), aft'd, 495 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting the "strategic
and especially central place of the private practicing lawyer in the investment process and in the
enforcement of the body of federal law aimed at keeping that process fair.... The task of enforcing
the securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders ... ").
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PROFESSIONALS AND RICO

Targeting professionals for disproportionate liability is sometimes
defended on the ground that this is the most effective way to minimize
the consequences of the wrongful conduct of others that cannot be eliminated. We cannot reform the corrupt, the argument goes, but we can
make the incorruptible professionals even more careful.
Although this approach has from time to time influenced the enforcement strategies of government agencies, 46 the argument is dubious
at best. Professionals inevitably sued in the wake of financial disasters on
the theory that they could have been more careful, taken an extra step,
given an extra warning, can reasonably conclude that they will be sued
no matter what they do, given their resources and the attraction to find a
deep pocket defendant that must pay. When the law sends that message,
its deterrent power is dissipated. The power to encourage proper conduct exists only if there is some benefit-i.e., freedom from exposurefrom conformity. If an individual will be sued no matter what his conduct, what incentive is there to exercise care?
Changing RICO will not solve the problem, but RICO reform would
be a start. Several sessions of Congress have wrestled with RICO reform
proposals, and while I am sympathetic to the objectives of those proposals, I offer here a mere modest first step that may have wider political
acceptability. Automatic trebling of damages in civil RICO cases should
be abolished. Instead, trebling should occur only in conjunction with
procedures designed to preclude damages disproportionate to a defendant's conduct. Under tort reform statutes of several states, the fact finder
is required to compare a given defendant's responsibility for the plaintiff's loss with the responsibility of others who contributed to that losswhether or not the others are parties to the case, whether because of lack
of resources or otherwise. 4 7 The fact finder's assignment of relative responsibility to the defendant determines the actual damages recoverable
from that defendant. Some federal courts have mandated an analogous
procedure in multi-defendant cases when a plaintiff settles with some defendants and proceeds to trial against others.48
If such devices are acceptable limitations when dealing with a plaintiff's actual damages, they are even more justifiable if one decides to regulate the component of RICO damages which, by definition, goes beyond
compensating the plaintiff for actual injury. Regulating and limiting imposition of the noncompensatory compoient of civil RICO damages will
not solve the problem of disproportionate professional liability, but this
modest reform will at least be a start.

46 See Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979);
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
47 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1989); see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton
Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1989) (for adiscussion of the statute's operation).
48 See, e.g., Franklin .v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989); Alvarado Partners v. Mehta,
723 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1989).

